founded jointly at
the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
with the Wechsler Family
Foundation
Vol. 7, No. 19 4
November 2007
Why Are the IAEA and Dr. Mohammed
El-Baradei Protecting Iran?
Gerald M.
Steinberg
The evidence that Iran is making progress towards acquiring nuclear
weapons is staring everyone in the face - the banks of centrifuges from A.Q.
Khan's proliferation supermarket (used by Pakistan for its bomb) and other
technology inappropriate for a civil power program; the subterfuge that kept
these and other activities from the IAEA inspectors for many years; the import
of components and evidence of facilities for testing weapons design.
For over three years, the quarterly IAEA reports on Iran contained the
details of violations, obstruction of inspector's visits, important
inconsistencies between official claims and the results of tests from samples
taken from various facilities, and other forms of non-compliance. But the
final assessment in each report, signed by the director-general, absurdly
concluded that this evidence did not demonstrate that Iran was seeking nuclear
weapons.
El-Baradei may have chosen what he sees as the path of least resistance by
acquiescing to Iran's aspirations to become a nuclear power. This was also the
dominant view in Europe, at least until the rise of Ahmadinejad and the
realization that stable deterrence based on the U.S.-Soviet Cold War model was
not applicable to a nuclear-armed Iran.
El-Baradei's complicity in the Iranian effort to acquire nuclear weapons
is counterproductive. The further that Iran advances, the higher the
probability of confrontation and military action in the next two to four
years.
Instead, if the IAEA and El-Baradei were to join in the effort to warn and
deter the Iranian regime, it might still be possible to halt the uranium
enrichment and similar activities, without needing to use force.
Denying the
Obvious
The repeated statements by Dr. Mohammed
El-Baradei, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), incongruously denying that Iran is seeking and making progress towards
acquiring nuclear weapons, are difficult to explain. The evidence is
staring everyone in the face - the banks of centrifuges from A.Q. Khan's
proliferation supermarket (used by Pakistan for its bomb) and other technology
inappropriate for a civil power program; the subterfuge that kept these and
other activities from the IAEA inspectors for many years; the import of
components and evidence of facilities for testing weapons design. Taken
together, the case is overwhelming, not only in Washington and Jerusalem, but
also in Paris, London, Moscow and Beijing.
So why is
El-Baradei insisting on denying the obvious? He is an Egyptian national,
but without a history of ideologically or religiously motivated policies or
statements, and does not share the visceral anti-Israel and anti-Western
positions held by the Nasserites such as Amr Mousa (ex-foreign minister and now
head of the Arab League). Indeed, when El-Baradei was first nominated to head
the IAEA after many years as a lower level official, the Egyptian government
proposed another candidate. And in official visits to Israel, El-Baradei showed
a high level of diplomatic skill in repeating the traditional call for universal
accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but acknowledging the
complexity of the Israeli situation. His stateme nts and activities projected an
image of an international civil servant who took these obligations and
commitments seriously.
Seeking to
Rehabilitate the IAEA
In this spirit, during his first
years as IAEA director-general beginning in 1997, El-Baradei continued and even
accelerated the effort to rehabilitate the IAEA and its tattered image as the
world's nuclear proliferation watchdog under the 1970 NPT. In 1981, following
the Israeli operation that destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor before it could
start producing plutonium, the IAEA was exposed as lacking professionalism and
credibility. Officials were shown to have closed their collective eyes to Saddam
Hussein's illegal diversions from an ostensibly civil nuclear program to weapons
development, leaving Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin with no alternative
to military action.
The IAEA's inspectors and verification
experts worked to re-establish credibility, enforcing enhanced safeguards that
were designed to prevent the kind of subterfuge employed by Saddam. Their
detailed reports on the status of Iraq's nuclear program during this period (and
its limitations) turned out, in some areas, to be more accurate than the U.S.
government assessments. And while El-Baradei's interpretation of the dangers
posed by Saddam's continuing nuclear activities downplayed the implications, and
he argued against the military action that removed Saddam Hussein, the IAEA did
not cover up or tamper with the evidence.
Ignoring the Evidence on Iranian Nuclear
Weapons Development
But on Iran, the IAEA under
El-Baradei has again lost credibility and is covering up wholesale violations of
the NPT and the efforts of the extremist leaders of the Islamic Republic to
acquire nuclear weapons. For over three years, the quarterly IAEA reports on
Iran contained the details of violations, obstruction of inspector's visits,
important inconsistencies between official claims and the results of tests from
samples taken from various facilities, and other forms of non-compliance. But
the final assessment in each report, signed by the director-general, absurdly
concluded that this evidence did not demonstrate that Iran was seeking nuclear
weapons. This process delayed the imposition of sanctions that might have
dissuaded Iran from this path. Eventually, even the more reluctant leaders in
Russia, China, and India recognized the overwhelming nature of the evidence,
rejected El-Baradei's assertions, and voted in September 2005 to officially find
Iran in non-compliance with the NPT and to start the sanctions process.
Since then, El-Baradei's summaries of the quarterly IAEA
reports, which are the basis for UN Security Council reviews and consideration
of increased sanctions, continue to deny the Iranian threat. He also has started
to echo Iranian claims to be beyond the "point of no return" in enriching
uranium to the level required for weapons - a boast that the IAEA's own data
does not support. This has again cast the IAEA as a target for derision and
ridicule and led some key professionals to leave the agency.
El-Baradei's behavior also has slowed the impact of the
limitations imposed by the U.S.-led international "coalition of the willing" on
Iranian banks and financial institutions. These targeted sanctions have had a
very direct impact on the regime and leadership, leading to signs of rising
dissatisfaction and acts of defiance in Iran. There is evidence that more
sanctions would accelerate the internal opposition and slow or even force a halt
to the effort to acquire nuclear weapons.
Explaining El-Baradei's
Behavior
It is difficult to explain the logic of
El-Baradei's behavior, which is the opposite of what is expected for the head of
an international watchdog organization whose decisions have a major impact on
international security and stability. One factor may be personal - in 2005, when
the Bush Administration opposed his selection for a third term as
director-general, in large part because of the Iranian cover-up, they failed to
get much support in the Board of Governors. Supporting Iran is the most
effective form of retaliation against the United States.
Beyond this dimension, El-Baradei understandably wants to
defend the IAEA and the NPT framework from a wrenching confrontation over the
Iranian nuclear weapons program that could mark the end of this security
framework based on treaties and international enforcement organizations. He may
have chosen what he sees as the path of least resistance by acquiescing to
Iran's aspirations to become a nuclear power. This was also the dominant view in
Europe, at least until the rise of Ahmadinejad and the realization that stable
deterrence based on the U.S.-Soviet Cold War model was not applicable to a
nuclear-armed Iran and a regional arms race.
After having
failed to prevent the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the IAEA's director-general may now
be overcompensating by embracing the Iranian claims in the hope of preventing a
military attack on Iran. His angry reaction to unconfirmed reports that Israel
destroyed a North Korean-built nuclear reactor in Syria, and the demand that
information on NPT violations be provided to the IAEA for action, can also be
understood as an attempt to salvage the agency's severely damaged
reputation.
But if this is El-Baradei's objective,
his complicity in the Iranian effort to acquire nuclear weapons and the obvious
attempt to cover-up the evidence is counterproductive. The further that Iran
advances, the higher the probability of confrontation and military action in the
next two to four years. Instead, if the IAEA and El-Baradei were to join in the
effort to warn and deter the Iranian regime, it might still be possible to halt
the uranium enrichment and similar activities, without needing to use force.
This is the only way that the NPT will survive, and the world will be spared the
dangers of a radical Iranian regime armed with nuclear weapons.
* *
*
Prof. Gerald M. Steinberg is head of the Political
Studies Department at Bar-Ilan University, a fellow of the Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs, and Executive Director of NGO
Monitor.
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